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Abstract
While five-month-old infants show orientation-specific sensitivity to changes in the 
motion and occlusion patterns of human point-light displays, it is not known whether infants 
are capable of binding a human representation to these displays. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that infants do not encode the same physical properties for humans and material 
objects. To explore these issues we tested whether infants would selectively apply the 
principle of solidity to upright human displays. In the first experiment infants aged six and 
nine months were repeatedly shown a human point-light display walking across a computer 
screen up to ten times or until habituated. Next, they were repeatedly shown the walking 
display passing behind an in-depth representation of a table, and finally they were shown the 
human display appearing to pass through the table top in violation of the solidity of the 
hidden human form. Both six- and nine-month-old infants showed significantly greater 
recovery of attention to this final condition. This suggests that infants are able to bind a solid 
vertical form to human motion. In two further control experiments we presented displays that 
contained similar patterns of motion but were not perceived by adults as human. Six- and 
nine-month-old infants did not show recovery of attention when a scrambled display or an 
inverted human display passed through the table. Thus, the binding of a solid human form to 
a display in infants only seems to occur for upright human motion. The paper considers the 
implications of these findings in relation to theories of infants’ developing conceptions of 
objects, humans and animals. 
Keywords: body concept, biological motion, animacy, point-light displays, person-
perception, solidity, categorisation, infant cognition, core knowledge, cognitive development, 
dorsal and ventral streams.
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Introduction
While much has been learned about infants’ developing sensitivities to human faces
(Turati, Simion, Milani, & Umilta, 2002) relatively little is known about infants’ developing 
representations of the properties of the human body. Recently, it has been discovered that 
eight-month-old infants show differential event related potentials (ERPs) for biologically 
plausible and implausible movements of the human arm (Reid, Belsky, & Johnson, in press) 
and that five-month old infants appear to be sensitive to violations involving a moving hand 
passing through a hidden object behind a screen (Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, in press). Thus, 
there is evidence that infants are able to understand some of the properties and actions of 
arms and hands (Woodward & Guajardo, 2002). However we still know relatively little about 
infants’ representations of the whole human form.
This area is surprisingly under-researched, given that a ‘body concept’ may be a 
precursor to infants’ developing understanding of other people as agents with a single, unified 
goal (Gallagher, 1995, 2005). Also the development of a representation of the whole body 
could underpin infants’ developing abilities to differentiate humans from other animals 
(Quinn & Eimas, 1998). Of specific importance may be the ability to represent the vertical 
human trunk. Particularly at a distance, the vertical trunk distinguishes humans from most 
animals, and the direction the trunk is facing also gives an indication of the focus of a 
person’s attention. Therefore, one could speculate that while infants may initially have a 
prototype that applies to people and animals alike, consisting of a face combined with a 
generic body form, later there may emerge a specific human prototype that consists of a 
human face combined with a vertically aligned body (Quinn, 2004).
The few studies that have looked at infants’ understanding of the whole human body 
are intriguing. One study found that not until eighteen months do infants show differential 
attention to scrambled pictures of whole human bodies where the arms and legs are moved to 
atypical locations (Slaughter, Heron and Sim, 2002). This shows a surprisingly late-
developing ability in comparison to infants’ early responses to scrambled human faces 
(Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991). Another study, however, suggests that infants 
may encode aspects of the human form much earlier. Specifically, infants at three months 
show differential brain activity (ERPs) to scrambled pictures of headless bodies when a leg is
moved to the head’s location (Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005). It may be that, while 
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infants do not have access to an explicit pictorial representation of the human form before 18 
months, younger infants may have access to implicit representations, at least of parts of 
bodies, which allow them to make sense of others’ movements and intentions. However, it is 
not clear what form such representations might take and which properties of humans would 
be incorporated into these representations.
Furthermore, it is even possible that infants may encode the properties of humans, 
animals and objects in different ways. Kulmeier, Bloom, & Wynn (2004) have suggested that 
5-month-old infants may not apply the same constraints to the continuity of human versus 
object motion. They found that, while infants were able to track the number, location and 
continuous motion of boxes that disappear behind screens, they did not appear to track the 
continuous motion of humans in the same way. They speculate that infants may construe 
some of the physical properties of humans differently from those of material objects. 
However, others have suggested that this data may not support such a strong conclusion 
(Rakison & Cicchino, 2004), and there is other, more recent, evidence which conflicts with 
this view, suggesting that 5-month-old infants do apply at least some of the same physical 
constraints to humans and object. Specifically, infants appear to perceive the hands of 
humans as solid inviolable objects (Saxe, Tzelnic & Carey, in press).
Clearly, there is still much to be learned about infants’ abilities to represent the whole 
human form, and to establish which of the material properties of humans are encoded by 
infants. Moreover, we need to consider the role that specific patterns of motion might play in 
the formation of these representations. We know that moving objects are generally more 
salient than static objects, and that some aspects of motion, such as being self-starting and 
having an irregular path, may be of particular importance for infants’ categorisation of 
animate versus inanimate objects (Opfer, 2002; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). However,
there has been little research examining how more specific aspects of so-called biological
motion might allow infants to distinguish between humans and animals. While there is some 
evidence that infants appear able to categorise four-legged animals and vehicles on the basis 
of motion alone (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2001, 2002), we do not yet know if infants are able 
to recognise humans as distinct from other animals on the basis of their patterns of motion.
Note that the vertical alignment of humans means that efficient walking and running are
dependent on the counter-swinging of arms and legs that are located one above the other. 
This motion pattern clearly distinguishes humans from those few other animals that walk 
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upright, compare, for example, with penguins or bears that do not swing their arms when 
walking. Consequently, we might hypothesise that infants would incorporate these specific
patterns of biological motion into their developing prototype of a human.
We might further speculate that if both the physical properties of the human form and 
the associated motion patterns of humans are incorporated into infants’ developing human 
prototype, then the presentation of human biological motion, in the absence of other cues,
might directly tap into infants’ emerging representation of the physical properties of the 
human form. To explore these issues we adapted and extended work that has examined 
infants’ responses to people presented as point-light displays. These are created by filming 
reflective patches attached to the legs and arms of people as they move in the dark (Mass, 
Johansson & Jansson, 1971), and can also be made for moving animals (Arterberry & 
Bornstein, 2001, 2002; Mather & West, 1993) and objects (Moore, Hobson & Lee, 1997; 
Hubert, Wicker, Moore, Monfardini, Duverger, Da Fonséca, &  Deruelle, in press).  These 
displays present motion patterns but do not provide the surface information that might 
normally be used for recognition. Indeed, static point-light displays are rarely recognised, and 
are often described as a collection of stars or as a Christmas tree. Thus, to make sense of 
these displays, observers need to be sensitive to the patterns of motion depicted, and be able 
to link these to a representation of the likely underlying form.
Notably, for point-light displays of fixed rigid structures like a box, there is only one
solution that fits the available perceptual data. For human displays, however, there are many 
perceptual solutions that could account for the spatial relationships between the moving lights 
(Johansson, 1973). Despite this fact, human point-light displays are recognised rapidly (in 
less than half a second), and usually much more quickly than point-light displays of objects
(Moore, Hobson & Lee, 1997). Interestingly this is the case even for people with intellectual 
delays (see Moore, Hobson & Anderson, 1995). It has also been found that there are specific 
areas of the brain that are particularly sensitive to these movements (Bonda,  Petrides, Ostry, 
& Evans, 1996; Downing, Jiang, Shuman & Kanwisher, 2001) and observers find human 
displays compelling and attractive, and appear well attuned to the meanings they depict. For 
example, adults can detect the identity, gender and age of the person filmed (Cutting & 
Kozlowski 1977; Frykholm, 1983; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977; Runeson & Frykholm, 1986), 
are able to describe their actions easily, can identify their emotional state (Dittrich, 
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Troscianko, Lea & Morgan, 1996; Moore, et al., 1997; Pollick, 2002), and even can tell a 
person’s real versus deceptive intentions (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). 
Significantly, if the lights in these displays are temporally or spatially scrambled in 
some way, or if a human display is inverted, the perceptual effect is completely lost, and 
participants no longer see the displays as human (Verfaillie, 1993). Thus, at least for adults, 
there appears to be a direct correspondence between the orientation and phase of the motion 
of human point-light displays and the perception of an underlying human form, and this 
process appears to occur rapidly, with little conscious cognitive effort, and delivers rich 
levels of meaning.  The question for this study is whether this is also true for young infants.
Studies have shown that infants do find point-light displays compelling, often looking 
at them continuously for long periods (Fox & McDaniel, 1982). Infants are also sensitive to 
subtle changes in the movements of these displays (Bertenthal, Proffit, & Cutting, 1984; 
Bertenthal, Proffit, Kramer & Spetner, 1987). Notably, three-month-old infants discriminate 
between in- and out-of-phase presentations of human movements, where the motion of some 
of the individual lights are delayed, and can also discriminate typical from atypical occlusion 
patterns, suggesting that they might process the displays globally (Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994).
However, infants’ sensitivity to changes in movement patterns does not necessarily mean that
they are aware that the movement of the point-light display is specifically human, and even if 
they were aware of this, it would not necessarily mean that infants are binding a prototype of 
a human form to these displays. Indeed, this process is likely to be dependent on the 
development of the dorsal and ventral streams of the brain which integrate form and motion 
(Johnson, Mareschal & Csibra, 2001; Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994). As these neural streams 
are not believed to be integrated until around the middle of the first year (Johnson, Bremner, 
Slater, Mason, & Foster, 2002), it is unlikely that three-month-old infants would have the 
necessary neural architecture to allow them to link the motion of human point-light displays 
with an associated human form.  
However, at around five months of age, infants begin to show sensitivity to changes in 
the phase and patterns of occlusion of human point-light displays only when the human 
display is upright (Bertenthal, Proffitt, Spetner & Thomas, 1985), thereby paralleling the 
orientation-specificity effects found in adults. Thus, by this age, it is possible to speculate that 
infants would have in place the necessary neural architecture, and are making sense of the 
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displays by employing knowledge constraints and linking a developing orientation-specific
representation of the human form to the human motion depicted (Bertenthal, 1993). However, 
this might be overstating infants’ abilities. Infant sensitivity to changes in the motion of right-
way-up human displays may occur simply because, by five months of age, an infant’s 
perceptual system will have had far more exposure to human arms and legs operating under 
gravity constraints in the upright orientation. Thus, one might parsimoniously explain infants’ 
selective responses to upright point-light displays purely in terms of familiarity with upright 
human motion. Furthermore, even if some knowledge constraints are applied to human point-
light displays and a developing human representation is mapped onto the motion patterns of 
the point-light display, it is not necessarily the case that infants would incorporate the same 
physical properties into this representation as they would for a physical object (Kulmeier et 
al, 2004). Specifically, even though they may bind a form to the human point-light display
they may not perceive a point-light display as having solid and inviolable properties like a 
material physical object.
Thus, this study set out to determine whether, in the second half of the first year 
infants were capable of binding a human representation to upright human motion depicted in 
human point-light displays, and to ascertain whether this representation would incorporate 
some of the same physical properties that are applied to other material objects, as might be 
predicted by Saxe et al (in press). Specifically, we wished to see if infants represented a 
human point-light display as a solid vertical form, and correspondingly applied the principle
of solidity, such that it would be seen as a violation of this principle if the hidden solid form 
underlying the display occupied the same physical space as a visible material object
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Spelke, Breinlinger,  Macomber, & Jacobson, 
1992). As we were unclear whether or not six-month-old infants would apply solidity to these 
displays, we tested groups of six-month-old and nine-month-old infants. By nine months of 
age infants appear able to use biological motion to categorise animals and vehicles, and make 
distinctions when subsequently presented with an out-of-category picture, thereby suggesting 
that they are at least able to link motion to a basic pictorial form (Arterberry & Bornstein, 
2001, 2002). Thus, we anticipated that, even if six-month-old infants might not apply solidity 
to these displays, nine-month-old infants may be able to do so.
To test our hypothesis we created three experiments. In Experiment 1, we assessed 
whether infants would show increased attention when a point-light walker passed through the 
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space occupied by an in-depth representation of a table. It is known that, from four months of 
age, infants can use perspective and gradient cues in two dimensional computer arrays to 
represent three dimensions (Durand & Lecuyer, 2002), thus it was expected that infants 
would interpret the table as a solid object. The question was whether infants would also treat 
the human point-light walker as a solid object and show increased attention when the table 
and human walker appeared to occupy the same physical space.
In Experiments 2 and 3 we went on to explore whether the application of the solidity 
principle was uniquely applied to a typical human point-light walker or would occur for other
vertically aligned versions of point-light displays that contained similar motion patterns. Thus 
in Experiment 2 we assessed infants’ sensitivity to violations of a scrambled point-light 
display, which contained the same overall movement as a human display and was arranged 
along the same vertical dimension, but in which the motion patterns of the point lights were
‘phase-shifted’ and transposed. Finally in Experiment 3 we tested the orientation-specificity 
of the effect, by seeing whether or not infants would show an equivalent response to the 
violation of an inverted version of the walking human display, which was equally as coherent 
as an upright display.
Experiment 1: Violation of the solidity of a human point-light display
The experiment had a repeated measures design and consisted of three phases 
administered in a fixed order. In the first phase, a human point-light display walked
repeatedly from right to left across the computer screen (each repeat is henceforth termed an 
event). In the second phase a table was introduced and the point-light walker repeatedly 
crossed the screen behind the table (henceforth called the behind-the-table phase). Finally, 
the human point-light walker repeatedly passed through the space occupied by the table top
(through-the-table phase).  It was hypothesised that, if infants begin to bind a prototypical 
representation of humans to the unique movement of human point-light displays during the 
first year, then infants would show greater attention during the phase when the human point-
light display apparently walked through the table, than when passing behind the table.
Note that the fixed-order design was adopted in order to be more conservative.
Specifically, the predicted increase in attention to the violation of solidity in the final phase 
had to occur after infants had already had prolonged exposure to the table and to the 
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movement of the human point-light display over the two preceding phases. Furthermore, the 
through-the-table stimulus differed from the behind-the table stimulus only in terms of the 
occlusion pattern of the familiar walker. In phase two, however, infants were introduced both 
to a new pattern of occlusion, as the familiar walker passed behind the new table, and to a 
brand new object, the table itself. Thus, in terms of surface perceptual features, local 
movement patterns and occlusion information, the second phase had more surface perceptual 
novelty than third phase. Consequently, unless infants perceived the point-light walker as a 
solid form, infants would be expected to show greater recovery of attention during the second 
phase, which came earlier and was more perceptually salient.
Participants
Infants were recruited via health professionals in the UK and were full-term. Two age 
groups of infants were tested. One group consisted of infants aged 6 to7 months (N= 16, age, 
M= 205.8 days SD = 22 days) and the second group consisted of infants aged 8 to 10 months
(N = 16, age, M= 285.2 days, SD = 24 days). Henceforth these are referred to as the 6- and 9-
month-old age groups. Three of the 6-month-old infants and three of the 9-month-old infants 
were excluded from the analysis, five due to fussing and one infant who looked continuously 
throughout a phase. The two groups were similar in terms of the SES of the family and in 
level of maternal education and age.
Stimuli
The stimuli were created using Macromedia Director and displayed on a Sony 
Trinitron 17” monitor set to a 640 by 480 resolution. Initially, a five second video clip of a 
walking human point-light display was filmed. This film was digitised to produce 100 
bitmaps which were imported into the animation program. The coordinates of each point-
light over time were then recorded in a digital array. This allowed the on-line manipulation of 
the displays during their presentation in Experiments 2 and 3. During each walking sequence 
the coordinates were used to animate nine circles, measuring 10 pixels in diameter.  When, in 
the original clip, a point-light was occluded, the animated circle was deleted from the 
animation frame. In each event the animated point-light display took five seconds to walk 
from right to left across the screen and then disappeared. After a one second delay the point-
light display reappeared from the right. 
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[Figure 1 here]
The table remained visible throughout phases two and three when the walker passed 
behind, or through, the table. The table was coloured blue and was drawn in perspective and 
shaded to give the impression of depth. See Figure 1 for a black-and-white version of a frame 
taken from the violation animation sequence (also see the electronic annex). The table 
consisted of two bitmaps located in the centre of the screen. One bitmap was of the table top 
and front legs and was 180 pixels in height and width and positioned 90 pixels from the 
bottom of the screen. The two back legs constituted a second bitmap of 90 x 90 pixels.  
During the second phase, when the point-light walker passed behind the table, all the point-
lights passed behind both bitmaps. Note that the background was set to transparent so that 
only the table legs and table top, and not the area of the bitmaps between the table legs,
occluded the point-lights as the walker passed behind the table. 
During phase three, when the point-light walker appeared to walk through the table, 
the point-lights in the upper half of the display passed in front of the table top while the point-
lights in the bottom half of the display passed behind the front legs, but in front of the bitmap 
of the back legs of the table (see Figure 1). Note that in phase three the length of the back 
legs was reduced by five pixels to make the table appear slightly further back and more 
directly in the path of the point-light display. The height of the point-light displays as they 
appeared on the screen was 10 cm and the height of the table was 6cm. Thus the top of the 
table was level with the waist of the human point-light display.
Procedure
Infants were seated in a baby car-seat on the floor, 60-70cm from the computer 
monitor. The monitor was embedded in a black surround with further black screens placed 
either side. A video camera recorded each infant’s visual behaviour through a hole in the 
surround located above the computer screen. Key presses were made on-line during testing to 
record the direction of looking (either towards or away from the screen). Reliability of the 
data generated by key pressing was then assessed by comparing these on-line records with the 
off-line timings of two additional raters who examined the video recordings of ten of the 
infants (five from Experiment 1 and five from Experiments 2 and 3) and registered the onset 
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and offset times of each look towards the screen. There were large and significant 
correlations between on- and off-line assessments of number of looks and of the recorded 
durations of peak looks for all phases of the experiments (Phase 1, number of looks r = .83 
and duration of longest look r = .83, p <.01; Phase 2, number of looks r = .76 and duration of 
longest look r = .80, p < .01; Phase 3, number of looks r = .80 and duration of longest look r
= .88, p <.01). Thus 'on-line' key pressing proved a reliable estimate of true infant looking 
behaviour.
At the beginning of the experiment, and at the beginning of each new test phase, 
infants’ attention was brought towards the computer screen by the presentation  of  changing 
shapes of different sizes and colours and by a computer-generated ‘quacking’ sound. For each 
phase, therefore, some small initial recovery in attention was induced in response to this 
stimulus. As soon as infants fixated on the screen, the attention grabbing stimulus was 
replaced by the point-light display stimulus and this was recorded as the beginning of the first 
look.
Infants may be long or short lookers depending on the way in which they process the 
global properties of the display (Columbo, Freeseman, Coldren & Frick, 1995). To ensure 
that short lookers were not over exposed to the displays, and to prevent the long lookers
becoming too fatigued and unlikely to complete all three phases, infants moved on to the next 
phase when they had habituated, or had seen a maximum of ten events1. Habituation was 
determined on-line using a computer algorithm. As for standard habituation measures, a
decrease in the lengths of looks was taken as an indication that habituation had occurred. An 
infant had habituated if the average of the most recent two looks to the screen, divided by the 
average of the most recent two looks away, was less than 50% of the total average duration of 
looks divided by the total average of the looks away2. 
1 Note that for the first six infants tested the number of events was set to 20, but two 
of these infants did not reach the final phase due to fussing. Four infants were presented with 
more than ten events for the first two phases only and examination of the data showed there 
to be no differences in the mean duration of peak looks between these and the other infants.
2 The only difference to a standard criterion is that this also allows an increase in 
looking away to be an indicator of habitation. In fact, as the length of each look away 
remained constant throughout the phases in all tasks, the denominator had little influence on 
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Results
The first thing to note was that the number of events we presented across the phases 
appeared to be appropriate, as the majority of infants did not become overtired by phase three
and all infants showed a clear decrement of attention within each phase (see Figure 2). Six-
and nine-month-old infants were presented with a similar number of events, around 8 for 
each phase3 and this number did not differ significantly across phases, ages or across 
subsequent experiments. Thus, setting the maximum number of events to ten appeared both 
to be sufficient to enable infants to demonstrate a clear decrement in attention within each 
phase, and to allow some of the ‘shorter lookers’ to habituate and move on to the next phase. 
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows the mean lengths of the first two and last two looks made by the 
groups of infants in each phase. The figure also shows the mean peak looks made by the two 
groups of infants during each phase. The prediction was that if infants were ‘surprised’ by 
the violation of the solidity of a human point-light display, then they should show a greater 
recovery of attention during the third phase, when the point-light walker repeatedly walked 
through the table, than during the second phase, when the human display walked behind the 
table. Note that we predicted that this recovery would be larger during the third phase even 
though the second phase introduces more perceptual novelty, involving as it does both the 
introduction of a new object (the table) and a change in the occlusion patterns of the point-
lights. 
Thus, the main dependent variable to be used in the analysis was the amount of 
recovery from the first to the second phase, and from the second to the third phase. This was 
the calculation, with habituation being primarily determined by changes in the duration of 
looks to the screen.
3 Number of events for Experiment 1: six-month-olds, walking, M = 7.7, SD = 1.9; 
behind-the-table, M = 7.9, SD = 2.5; through-the-table, M = 7.4, SD =2.1, and for the nine-
month-old infants, walking, M =7.1, SD = 2.5, behind-the-table, M = 7.9, SD = 2.4; through-
the-table, M= 8.6, SD =2.2. Two, six and three, respectively, of the six-month-old infants and 
five, seven and eight of the nine-month olds infants were presented with the maximum of ten 
events over the three phases.
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calculated by subtracting the duration of the final look during one phase from the duration of 
the peak look for the next phase. Figure 2 suggests that, in line with the hypothesis, infants’ 
amount of recovery was greater for the final phase when the human point-light display passed 
through the table top than in the second phase when it walked behind the table: Six-month-
old infants, behind-the-table recovery, M = 11.22, SD = 2.5, through-the-table, M = 14.85, SD 
= 3.9; Nine-month-old infants, behind-the-table recovery M = 13.0, SD = 2.4, through-the-
table M = 20.4, SD= 3.9.
To further examine this effect we performed a Phase (behind-the-table v through-the-
table) by Age (6mo v 9mo) analysis of variance on amount of recovery. The analysis of 
variance revealed a significant Phase effect, F (1,24) = 4.38, p = .047, partial Eta-squared = 
.15. Both the younger and older infants showed significantly greater recovery to the final 
phase where the point-light display passed through the table than to the second phase when 
the point-light display passed behind the table There was no significant Age effect and no 
Age-by-Phase interaction.
Conclusion
The data provide clear evidence that both the younger and older infants perceived the
human point-light display as representing a solid form, with all infants showing recovery in 
attention when this form was violated as it passed through the table top. However, from this 
experiment alone it is not possible to assess the extent to which infants respond selectively to 
human motion. It may be that infants would bind a solid form to any similar vertical 
combination of global and local motion patterns, even those that might appear relatively 
meaningless to adults. Thus, to explore the specificity of this effect we presented two further
versions of the experiment using displays containing vertically-aligned patterns of point-light 
motion derived from the original human motion, but that are not perceived by adults as 
representing a human form. 
Experiment 2: Violation of a ‘scrambled’ point-light display
For Experiment 2 we scrambled the movements of the original stimulus so that the 
point-light display contained the same overall internal and global motion but was not 
recognisable as a human. It was hypothesised that infants shown a scrambled display would 
treat this stimulus as an indistinct pattern of lights rather than as representing a solid coherent 
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human form and so, when this pattern of moving lights was intersected by the table, we 
predicted that infants would not show the same recovery in attention as found in Experiment
1 for the human display.
Participants
In order to contrast performance with that of the infants tested in Experiment 1, two 
new comparable groups of 6-month-old and 9-month-old infants were tested: six-month-old-
infants N= 15, age, M = 207.6 days, SD = 19 days; Nine-month-old infants, N = 12, age, M = 
282.9 days, SD = 26 days. Two of the six-month-old infants were excluded from the analysis 
because they looked continuously throughout a phase. All infants were recruited via health 
professionals and were full term. All groups were similar in terms of the SES of the family 
and in level of maternal education and age.
Stimulus and procedure
The same procedure was used as in Experiment 1, but for this experiment the point-
light display was an out-of-phase and partly inverted display. This ‘scrambled’ display was
made to be out-of-phase by randomly moving the start time of each point-light by up to four 
animation frames forwards or backwards in time (there being 20 frames per second). Thus the 
point-light representing the knee joint could be moving up to eight frames before or after the 
point-light on the corresponding ankle. Inversion of displays is known to interfere with 
recognition of human point-light displays by adults, however inverting the whole display 
would have changed the overall degree of movement in the bottom and top halves of the 
display which may lead to differences in the salience of the stimulus. Thus, to preserve the 
amount of movement in the upper and lower halves, but to further scramble the display, we 
inverted the point-lights only for the upper half of the display. During the second and third 
phases the same bitmaps of the table and legs were used as in Experiment 1.
Results
The mean numbers of events seen by infants across each phase were comparable to 
Experiment 1 (see footnote4.) Again the critical variables were the recovery made by infants 
4 Mean number of events, six-month-old infants, walking, M =8.0, SD=2.2, behind-
the-table, M = 7.8, SD=2.2, through-the-table, M = 8.1, SD= 2.0; nine-month-old infants, 
walking, M =8.2, SD=1.9, behind-the-table, M =8.8, SD= 1.3; through-the-table, M = 8.0, 
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during the second phase, when the point-light display passed behind the table, and the 
recovery made during the final phase, when the display passed through the table top. Figure 3 
shows the mean lengths of the first two and last two looks made during each phase by the two 
age groups for the scrambled stimulus. The figure also shows the mean peak looks made by 
the two groups of infants during each phase. The amount of recovery in seconds shown for 
this stimulus for phases two and three respectively were: Six-month-old infants’ recovery, 
behind-the-table, M = 11.3, SD = 2.5, through-the-table, M= 2.7, SD = 3.3; Nine-month-old 
infants’ recovery, behind-the-table, M= 16.0, SD = 2.6, through-the-table M = 6.4, SD = 3.4. 
[Figure 3 here]
To test whether infants showed significantly different patterns of recovery for the 
scrambled versus the human display, we performed a mixed model analysis of variance 
comparing the performance of the two new groups of infants tested on Experiment 2 with the 
performance of the infants presented with the human point-light display in Experiment 1, the
prediction being that there would be a significant interaction of stimulus type by phase. A 2 
(Stimulus: human v scrambled) by 2 (Phase: behind-the-table v through-the-table) by 2 (Age: 
6mo v 9mo) analysis of variance on amount of recovery revealed no overall significant 
effects of Age, F(1,47) =  2.9, ns, nor of Phase, F(1,47) = .92, ns. There was however a 
significant effect of Stimulus, F(1,47) = 6.28, p < .05, partial Eta-squared = .12, and a 
significant and predicted interaction of Phase by Stimulus F(1,47) = 15.34, p < .001, partial
Eta-squared = .25, with both the six-month-old and nine-month-old infants looking longer 
during the violation phase when the display was human compared with when the display was 
scrambled5
Conclusion
There was a clear difference in the responses of both younger and older infants to the 
violation of a human point-light display in Experiment 1 compared to the scrambled display
presented in Experiment 2, suggesting that the responses of infants are not generalised to all 
SD=1.6. Across the three phases six, five and five infants respectively of the six-month-old, 
and five, five and four of the nine-month-old infants were presented with the full ten events.
5 Note that the interaction effect here, and when comparing Experiment 1 and 3, is 
also significant when using peak looks as the dependent variable.
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displays that contain similar relative and global motion to that of a human. The 6- and 9-
month-old infants shown the human display passing through the table in Experiment 1 made 
a mean recovery of 14.9 seconds and 20.4 seconds respectively compared with only 2.7 
seconds and 6.4 seconds for the infants in Experiment 2. However, while this finding of 
differential responses to a normal human versus a scrambled display is compelling, this does 
not mean that infants will respond only to violations of human displays. It is possible, for 
example, that infants responded to the violation of the display in Experiment 1 , not because 
it was human, but simply because the motion between lights in the human display are more 
highly correlated than in the scrambled display. 
Experiment 3: Violation of the solidity of an inverted display
Thus, to test the robustness of the violation effect, and to see whether or not infants 
show sensitivity to orientation when attributing solidity to coherent point-light displays, we 
presented another two groups of infants simply with an inverted version of the walking point-
light display from Experiment 1. This display was equally coherent to the upright display 
used in Experiment 1. Furthermore, in order to present the same patterns of occlusion as 
those presented in Experiment 1, we inverted both the table and the point-light display.
Inverted human point-light displays contain all the same perceptual cues for rigidity and 
global coherence as upright displays, yet are not readily perceived by adults as meaningful 
(Verfaillie, 1993). Research with infants (Berthenthal, 1993) has shown that, by five months 
of age, infants’ discriminations to changes in the coherence and occlusion patterns of point-
light displays become orientation specific, suggesting that human point-light displays come to 
have an orientation-dependent meaning. While it is unknown at what age infants will begin to 
show orientation specific sensitivities to a violation of the solidity of the displays, it was 
anticipated, following on from the findings of Bertenthal (1993), that by six months of age 
infants would show lessened recovery to the violation of the solidity of an inverted display
compared to an upright display. 
Participants
Again, in order to contrast performance with that shown by infants in Experiment 1, 
two new comparable cohorts of infants were recruited: Six-month-old infants, N= 13, age, M
= 211.6 days SD= 15 days; nine-month-old infants, N = 15, age M= 284.5 days, SD = 29 
days. One of the six-month-old infants and three of the nine-month-old infants were excluded 
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from the analysis, two because of fussing and two because they looked continuously 
throughout.
Stimulus and procedure
The same procedure was used as previously. We presented the same stimulus and 
table bitmaps from Experiment 1 except that the human point-light display was inverted 
throughout and, during the second and third phases, the table bitmaps were also inverted. 
Note that, although inverted, the point-light display continued to move in the same direction 
as in Experiments 1 and 2, from right-to-left across the screen.
Results
Once again, the mean numbers of events seen by infants across each phase was 
comparable to those for Experiments 1 and 26. Figure 4 shows the mean lengths of the first 
two and last two looks made during each phase by the two age groups for the inverted 
stimulus. The figure also shows the mean peak looks made by the two groups of infants 
during each phase. The amount of recovery in seconds shown for this stimulus for phase two 
and three respectively were: six-month-old infants, behind-the-table recovery, M= 10.6, SD = 
3.3, through-the-table recovery, M= 11.3, SD = 3.5, nine-month-old infants, behind-the-table 
recovery, M = 14.2, SD = 3.3, through-the-table recovery M= 7.3, SD = 3.5. 
[Figure 4 here]
Again, we compared the performance of the groups of infants tested on this control 
experiment with the performance of the infants in Experiment 1. It was hypothesised that the 
infants tested with the inverted human stimulus would not show a significant recovery of 
attention when the point-light display passed through the table, thus there would be a 
significant interaction of stimulus type by phase. 
6 For six-month-old infants, walking, M =9.0, SD= 1.7, behind-the-table, M= 9.0, SD
= 1.4; through-the-table, M = 8.5, SD=2.1, and for the older infants, walking, M=8.8, SD=1.8, 
behind-the-table, M =8.9, SD=1.4; through-the-table, M = 9.0, SD = 1.6. Across the three 
phases, eight, seven and seven infants respectively of the six-month-olds were presented with
the full ten events, and for the nine-month-old infants, respectively, this occurred for, eight, 
seven and eight infants
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A 2 (Stimulus: upright human v inverted human) by 2 (Phase: behind-the-table v 
through-the-table) by 2 (Age: 6 v 9mo) analysis of variance of amount of recovery revealed 
no overall significant effects of Age, F(1,46) =  .46, ns, and Phase, F(1,46) = .31, ns. There 
was also no significant effect of Stimulus F(1,46) = 2.41, ns. There was, however, a 
significant and predicted interaction of Phase and Stimulus F(1,46) = 4.04, p =.05, partial
Eta-squared = .08.
Conclusions
The findings show that, even though infants were presented with a display containing 
the same occlusion information as the display used in Experiment 1, they did not show the 
same recovery to the violation of the solidity of the display. Note that, while infants clearly 
showed interest in these displays, they did not appear to find the inverted and unsupported 
table of specific interest, showing similar recovery in attention to the introduction of the table 
in Experiment 3 as the infants did during the same phase in Experiment 1. Thus the lack of a 
violation effect for the inverted display can not explained simply by infants attending more or 
less to the inverted table.
Discussion
The results suggest that both age groups of infants interpreted the in-depth 
representation of the table and the upright human point-light display as representing solid 
objects (Durand & Lecuyer, 2002). Critically, even six-month-old infants showed greater 
recovery of attention when the solidity of the human point-light display was apparently 
violated as it passed through the space occupied by the table, compared to when it passed
behind the table. No comparable effect was observed when infants were shown either a 
scrambled or an inverted point-light display passing through the table top. Specifically, the 
amount of recovery shown by infants to the apparent violation of the solidity of the human 
display was around twice the amount shown by infants who witnessed the control stimuli
pass through the table. The response to the apparent violation of the human point-light 
display cannot be explained simply in terms of sensitivity to changes in occlusion patterns, or 
in terms of the change in spatial relations between the table and a rigid pendular system, as 
changes in occlusion, and in spatial relations between the display and the table, occurred for 
the upright, scrambled and inverted displays alike. Furthermore, the human and control 
displays all equally allow for an arbitrary mapping of rigid connections between lights.
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In summary, the results show that, from six months, infants seem to bind a solid form 
to an upright human display. The findings also indicate that capacities for binding a solid 
form to human motion are sensitive to motion coherence and are orientation specific. To our 
knowledge this study is the first to demonstrate infants’ application of the solidity principle to 
human point-light displays, and is one of the first to demonstrate sensitivity to the violation of 
the solidity of an object or human when this occurs in full view of the infant rather than 
behind an occluder. Furthermore, previous studies looking at infants’ sensitivity to violations 
of whole body representations of humans have only violated the form by moving the location 
of the arms and legs (Slaughter, Heron & Simm, 2002; Gliga & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2005).
None so far have violated the vertical human trunk. Thus, this is also the first study to show 
that infants incorporate a solid and apparently inviolable human trunk into their developing
representations of the human form. The findings support the proposal of Bertenthal and 
colleagues (see Bertenthal, 1993) that, from five months, infants may use a whole body 
representation as a knowledge constraint when making orientation-specific discriminations 
between in- and out-of-phase point-light displays.  
In terms of the current debates about whether infants apply the same physical
constraints to humans as they do for objects, our results lend some support to the view that 
infants treat humans and objects alike in terms of solidity (see Saxe, et al, in press). Infants 
could be using general processes for recovering form from motion and, indeed, it could be 
predicted that infants would apply the solidity principle to any upright point-light display that 
depicts an equally familiar animate or inanimate object. However the findings do not rule out 
the possibility that infants could differentially ‘construe’ other important properties, such as 
the continuity of the location of objects and humans (Bloom, 2004; Kulmeier, Bloom, & 
Wynn, 2004). Thus, the findings as they stand do not exclude the possibility that infants 
might process the motion patterns of humans and objects using different neural pathways. 
Also the findings can not determine whether or not infants are utilising specialised, 
evolutionarily-adaptive processes for perceiving human motion (Moore et al, 1995; Vaina, 
Lemay, Choi, & Nakayama, 1990). To get to the bottom of these issues more studies are 
required that would explore infants’ sensitivity to violations of point-light displays of familiar 
animals and objects as well as humans, and that would test further an infant’s understanding 
of the relationship between solid objects and the hidden properties of the moving point-light 
displays of animals and humans.
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Certainly, further studies are needed to examine the extent to which the results here 
generalise to other types of point-light displays. We need to establish, for example, the role 
that horizontal motion plays in triggering the binding of representational prototypes to point-
light displays. Do infants show the same effect when presented just with a ‘treadmill’ point-
light display that walks on the spot and is intersected by a moving solid object? Also do 
infants show similar effects when humans are shown crawling rather than walking upright,
and do they show the same responses to violations of horizontal point-light displays of 
animals? Furthermore, we may wish to explore whether infants show sensitivity to violations 
of point-light-displays depicting only parts of the human form such as an individual arm.  
Abilities to represent the movement of the human trunk may have other important 
benefits apart from allowing infants to discriminate people from animals.  In particular, this 
may provide infants with additional indicators of a person’s focus of attention, particularly at 
a distance, and help infants to gain important information about a person’s intentions. For 
example, a person backing away from an object (or animal) while facing towards it, conveys 
a different meaning, one of wariness or fear, from a person who walks away from an object 
that is behind them. Indeed, there is evidence for specialist neurons that independently 
process the direction the human trunk is facing versus the overall direction of a person’s 
movement. (Perrett, Harries, Benson, Chitty, & Mistlin, 1990). Further work might look at 
when infants first differentiate the direction of a person’s trunk independently of the direction 
of motion, and assess the importance that trunk direction plays in understanding other’s 
intentions relative to the importance of the direction of a person’s eyes, face and head.
Indeed, it may be the case that infants’ abilities to represent the human form and the qualities 
of the human body, such as the direction of the trunk and the location of arms and legs, plays 
an important role in the development of an understanding of intentional human action. Thus 
we need to consider how infants’ development of a whole-body prototype fits with accounts 
of the development of bodily imitation and the development of the understanding of the 
intentions and agency of self and others (Gallagher, 2005; Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 
2002; Nielsen, Dissanayake & Kashima, 2003). 
Notwithstanding these important remaining questions, the findings do suggest that 
human motion patterns could play an important role in the formation of an infant’s
developing prototype of people. Infants’ sensitivity to human and animal motion may help 
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them in distinguishing people from other animals. Arterberry and Bornstein (2001, 2002), for 
example, have demonstrated that three-month-old infants seem to be able to categorise the 
movements of animals and vehicles presented as point-light displays, and that by nine-
months they link these to same-category, static pictures. Taken together with our findings, we 
might propose that, from six months, infants incorporate not only surface information 
regarding faces and body shape into their developing animal and human prototypes (Pauen, 
2000; Quinn & Eimas, 1998), but may also utilise unique patterns of biological movement 
that are specified by skeletal structures (see also Mather & West, 1993). This opens the 
possibility that sensitivity to biological movement, and the development of an associated 
whole-body, vertically-oriented representation may contribute to infants’ development of a
specific human category during the middle of the first year, and that this orientation-specific 
human representation could play an integral part in infants’ segregation of their 
representations of humans and animals (Quinn , 2004).
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Figure legends
Figure 1: A representation of a frame of the event in which the human point-light 
display passed through the perspective table (for the actual event the table was blue). Note 
that at this point in the event the two lights corresponding to the knees of the human are 
partly occluded by the table top while the wrist and hip lights are passing in front of the table 
top.
Figure 2: The average peak look and the first pair and last pair of individual looks 
made by the two groups of infants across the three phases of presentation of the upright 
human point-light display (Experiment 1). Note error bars denote standard error.
Figure 3: The average peak look and the first pair and last pair of individual looks 
made by the two groups of infants across the three phases of presentation of the scrambled
point-light display (Experiment 2).
Figure 4: The average peak look and the first pair and last pair of individual looks 
made by the two groups of infants across the three phases of presentation of the inverted
point-light display (Experiment 3).
Infants perceive human point-light displays as solid forms, page 29
Figure 1
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Figure 4
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